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ABSTRACT: This study applies the prevailing scholarly theories of strategic management, employment 
decisions, cost accounting and share reward schemes to a panel of questions raised by Colin Drury (2012) in the 
case study of the fictitious company Integrated Technology Services (UK) Ltd., ITS (UK). The paper provides 
model answers which can be used when working with the case study at institutions of higher education. The merit 
of the work lies in three areas. First, it provides an overview of theories accepted by the academia that can be 
utilized for further research. Second, it contrasts pro and contra arguments. Thus it shows the limitations of the 
very theories when applied to scenarios inspired by practical problems. Third, it develops an innovative Balanced 
Scorecard for ITS (UK). The scorecard can be used as an example when working with Drury’s case study. But it 
is also suitable for real life situations of business entities faced with oppressive overheads and deteriorating net 
margins, building on highly skilled workforce and trying to preserve its differentiated profile. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The balanced scorecard 
 
The balanced scorecard (BSC) incorporates financial and non-financial measures in order to assess company 
performance. This approach goes back to the research of Kaplan and Norton (1992), which used to group the 
measures into four perspectives: 
–  Customer Perspective 
–  Internal Business Perspective 
–  Innovation and Learning Perspective 
–  Financial Perspective  
These four perspectives link the company performance against its strategic goals (Braam & Nijssen, 2004). 
The goals may differ widely among different organisations, but they gravitate towards meeting customer demand, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
optimising internal processes, developing products and services to remain competitive and finally achieving 
financial rewards, i.e. the four perspectives (Atrill & McLaney, 2009).  
The adoption of the non-financial perspectives broadens the information used for decision making by 
management and thus enables the management to find better solutions compared to a focus on financial data only 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996a). Moreover, the easy availability of measures on a scorecard can encourage their use 
and thus facilitate the decision making process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  
The measures can be chosen by the very company to address its special needs. However, when using BSC it 
is crucial to focus on the key performance drivers and on their very outcome measures. The key drivers are those 
that match with the overall company strategy (Lipe & Saltarino, 2000).  
Also, there has to be a cause-and-effect relationship between the drivers and the outcomes. Otherwise, false 
assumptions about the interrelationship of metrics can mislead the management (Nørreklit, 2000).  
Through the cause- and-effect link, a BSC can be used not only to assess corporate performance, but also 
managerial achievement. Thus shareholders can create incentive schemes based on the realisation of BSC targets 
(Khan et al., 2010; Pollanen & Xi, 2011).  
The translation of strategy into operational metrics through BSC is only possible if staff and management 
are both committed to the strategic requirements and try to improve the metrics under evaluation. However, 
research shows that low level employees are rarely dedicated to strategic ambitions of the board, whereas 
management tend to ignore non -financial measures (Pessanha & Prochnik, 2006). However, this is rather 
drawback of management than of BSC. Hopwood (1974) shows that managerial styles that take account of 
subordinates’ concerns and non-financial metrics can be more suitable.  
Especially the customer perspective must not be ignored by management. Gupta and Zeithaml (2006) 
indicate that improved customer satisfaction increases profitability. Ittner and Larcker (1998) and Anderson et al. 
(2004) find out that minor growth of customer satisfaction can result in millions of dollars of increased firm 
value, i.e. stock returns.  
Furthermore, research conducted by Huber (1991) and Lapre and Tsikriktsis (2006) indicate that management 
evaluated by non- financial measures allocate their efforts and intensify their learning in order to influence these 
metrics positively. This, in turn, can have a positive effect on the overall company performance (Campbell, 2008). 
Having said that, BSC is just a tool to implement strategy. Therefore, the strategy itself has to be actionable 
and correspond to the corporate goals (Al-Baidhani, 2013). 
 
Recruiting and outsourcing of accounting personnel 
 
Accounting services can be obtained either through recruiting an accountant or by the way of outsourcing, 
i.e. using an accounting service provider. 
There are different tasks that can be performed by an accountant, i.e. financial, management or forensic 
accounting, internal or external audits (ACCA, 2011a). These roles come along with diverse capacities that can 
influence the recruit/outsource decision. So, a management accountant needs a thorough understanding of 
production processes whereas a financial accountant must be an expert of accounting standards (Bhimani et al., 
2013).  
One of the perceived advantages of outsourcing is cost reduction. Besides saving on salary, ITS (UK) could 
save training costs and office space rentals (Wienskowska & Stronka, 2005). This is important given ITS (UK)’s 
deteriorating net margin.  
Using an outside expert can free in-house capacity that can be using otherwise (Gómez Conde, 2015). This 
is certainly an issue for ITS (UK) with its budget control heavily relying on manpower.  
Sub-contractors are less vulnerable to a sudden absence due to personal reasons (illness, unexpected family 
commitments). In case of being prevented just another expert can be assigned to the task (Wienskowska & 
Stronka, 2005).  
Furthermore, sub-contractors can react more flexible to the company’s changing needs. They possess a wide 
spread expertise as compared to an in-house accountant. They also use sophisticated professional hard- and 
software thus reducing or eliminating the need of investment at ITS (UK) . The usage of such resources allows 
the sub-contractor to provide tailored high quality services. The benefits of the economies of scale can be shared 
with ITS (UK) via a favourable price (Wienskowska & Stronka, 2005).  
Finally, in case of poor service and dispute an accounting service provider is usually covered by an 
insurance policy which can account for ITS (UK)’s financial damage (Wienskowska & Stronka, 2005). This is 
not the case with employees which can be fired, but rarely have enough resources to account for corporate losses. 
 
 
 
 
 
Loss of control can occur if no in -house experts are available. However, this risk can be reduced through 
appropriate contract terms (Cuganesan et al., 2006).  
The workforce actually employed in accounting at ITS (UK) can put up resistance against outsourcing, 
especially if they are at risk of redundancy (ACCA, 2011b). From the viewpoint of ITS (UK), freeing manpower 
or making clerical staff redundant can help mitigate overhead costs. 
Confidentiality can be at risk if a sub-contractor provides similar services to ITS (UK)’s competitors 
(Robertson et al., 2004). Though, a financial damage can be covered by the sub-contractor’s insurance policy. 
 
Target costing 
 
Acc. to Hertenstein and Platt (1998) 80% of production costs are “locked in” at the development stage, 
when major decisions are made about the quality and features of the product. The number of the (standard) parts 
used is made at this point of time (Swenson & Everater, 2014). Once decided, it can prove expensive to 
implement major changes later. Therefore, to cap the costs from the beginning on, a profit margin is deducted 
from a competitive price to arrive at target costs (ACCA, 2011c).  
Target costs are to be compared with projected costs to estimate the target cost gap (Hematfar et al., 2013). The 
gap can be closed using various redesigning processes like using less or other parts or materials, train workers to 
benefit from learning curve effects or replace expensive employees with cheaper personnel. These options can be 
discussed with the customer prior to beginning of the production process (ACCA, 2011b). Further actions can be 
planned even if they are to be realised at a later stage of the product life cycle (Yazdifar & Askarany, 2011). 
 
Employee motivation and reward 
 
Theories of employee motivation 
 
Maslow (1954) develops a hierarchy of needs starting with the most fundamental ones like food and housing 
(psychological needs) and leading to the need to develop oneself acc. to one’s interests and attitudes (self-
actualisation). As soon as the most basic needs are satisfied, the person turns to a higher layer of the hierarchy; 
the lower layers lose their motivational effects (Jerome, 2013). In case of share schemes, this means that after a 
certain level of monetary reward is achieved, employees do not react with higher motivation.  
Herzberg (1964) creates a two-factor theory that differs between hygiene factors (job title, salary, fringe 
benefits) and motivators (self-realisation at the job, feel of responsibility, challenging work). In his opinion, 
hygiene factors only provide a background, whereas real motivation originates from psychological factors 
influenced by motivators (Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Mohanan et al., 2012). Therefore, share schemes can only 
play a minor role in motivating employees. 
 
Theories on employee rewards 
 
Acc. to the building block model of Fitzgerald and Moon (1996) employees should be rewarded for 
performance controllable by them. This is not necessarily the case with share schemes: the share price can rise or 
fall independent of the employees’ performance. Also, if there is a time lag between allocation of shares and the 
right to use them, the deferral and the uncertainty of the benefits can further reduce the employees’ feeling of 
controlling their reward (ACCA, 2011c).  
Hyman and Mason (1995) emphasise that subordinate employees usually receive too few shares to develop 
a feel of owning the company that is connected with rewards by shares.  
Contrary to low level employees, senior management can try to control and influence share prices through 
their management and governance decisions. However, if they try to push the share prices through short-term 
actions and misleading accounting policy to the detriment of the overall company strategy, such a “motivation” 
can be rather damaging for the organisation (Ryan, 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The strategic background of ITS (UK) 
 
A BSC can only be used reasonably if its performance measures are aligned with the overall strategy of the 
organization (Kaplan, 2010). ITS (UK) is specialized in providing computing and telecommunicating outsourcing 
support, especially for the gas and oil industry. High quality service is especially valued by customers who 
demand a mass of variations and ad-hoc changes to contracts. This is a differentiation strategy which allows 
meeting very special customer needs (Porter, 1998). Thus it should be possible to charge a price premium for 
outstanding services (Porter, 2004) which should help ITS (UK) to improve its margin.  
However, expanding into new markets and heavily relying on sub -contractors can hinder differentiation 
and impair quality. It can prove difficult for ITS (UK) to provide distinct services for clients as different as an oil 
company and a public organization and at the same time to try to save on costs. Thus ITS (UK) could become 
“stuck in the middle” (Johnson et al., 2011). 
 
The implementation and adoption of a balances scorecard at ITS (UK) 
 
Kaplan and Norton (1996b) suggest that BSC should be used on a business unit level. The IT Outsourcing 
service is the core business activity of ITS (UK) which earns the most revenue for the company and attracts the 
most client contracts. The Consulting business division is a small unit. Although it has a separate client base, it 
also conducts services for IT Outsourcing. The Staff service division provides services for the other two units. It 
does not have outside customers at all. With IT Outsourcing being the major division at ITS (UK), it is 
reasonable to focus on it when developing BSC.  
Research conducted by Slovic and MacPhillamy (1974) shows that management prefers to rely on common 
measures instead of making decisions on the basis of a variety of metrics, which differ among business units. 
This again points towards a joint BSC.  
In order to develop and to implement BSC, Kootanaee et al (2013) suggest to start with examining the 
organisational environment, for example using the Strength -Weakness-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) 
Framework. The measures of the four perspectives should be aligned to the organisational strategy and an 
automated reporting system established to provide up-to-date information.  
After the initial implementation, operations and activities should be linked to the performance measures and 
become subject of steady communication between management and staff (Cooper et al., 2011) so that BSC can 
be adopted successfully.  
It takes from two to four months to establish a BSC, which depends on the organisation size and the 
availability of trained staff. The scorecard should be adjusted to environmental changes semi-annually 
(Kootanaee et al., 2013). A critical evaluation of meeting the BSC goals should take place on a regular basis 
(Malina & Selto, 2001). 
For the Customer Perspective Kaplan and Norton (1992) suggest using the following metrics: 
–  Time 
–  Quality and Performance 
–  Cost  
Time is very important for ITS (UK) as it strives to be able to respond to customer needs immediately. 
Evaluation of communication protocols with customers and time sheets can be used to track customer waiting 
time per query.  
Quality and performance expectations can put ITS (UK) under pressure. Its oil industry clients want to limit the 
number of sub-contractors. This makes ITS (UK) as a general contractor providing services which are not its core 
competence. The qualification of sub-contractors should be assessed at a pre-contractual stage using questionnaires. 
Cost is a hot topic at the company. Currently the poor allocations of IT staff time to contracts results in 
customers paying not appropriate amounts. Customer complaints due to cost deviations from budget should be 
assessed via interviews of client managers. 
The Internal Business Perspective can be measured using the following criteria (Kaplan & Norton, 1992; 
Campbell et al., 2002): 
–  Employee skills 
–  Productivity 
–  Differentiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The availability of technically skilled IT staff is crucial for the company. Expenditure on job advertisement 
and job fair in relation to sales has to be evaluated using data from the accounting department.  
The productivity at ITS (UK) is hampered by poor automated control systems calling for individual 
monitoring. This increases overhead costs and the possibility of human error. Also, there is a lack of standard 
contract terms. Standard data sheets and standardized contract settings have to be developed and the number of 
deviations from standard analysed through internal controls.  
The company has a long-standing history of serving gas and oil industry. Now it expands into other 
industries and provides outsourcing support for the public sector. In order to sustain its differentiated profile a 
pre-contractual customer analysis should be performed.  
For the Innovation and Learning Perspective Mistry and Nandram (2005) suggest the following criteria for 
IT businesses: 
–  Research and development (R&D) expenditure 
–  Employee training 
–  Innovative environment  
The parent company ITSI encourages high R&D spending. The number of new product launches or patents 
can be an indicator of successful R&D programmes.  
ITS (UK) should have a sufficient number of skilled IT staff. This can be measured through training 
expenditure per employee using data from accounting department.  
To assess the innovative capacity staff interviews should be conducted to find out whether improvement and 
optimising suggestions are encouraged throughout ITS (UK).  
Regarding the Financial Perspective, the net margin of ITS (UK) is currently eroded through increasing 
overheads. Therefore, the overhead ratio=total overheads./.sales should be observed (Gaughan, 2009). Moreover, 
debtors (33.5£m) make over 41% of sales (80.5£m) showing that ITS (UK) has a very generous debtor policy, 
especially considering its low cash-at-hand position of 2.1£m. The control of the accounts receivable turnover 
ratio=credit sales./.average accounts receivable should help to change this policy and free cash for important 
business tasks like R&D or hiring/training of IT professionals. The information needed can be obtained from the 
accounting department. The BSC chart can be developed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation on recruiting and outsourcing of accounting personnel 
 
Acc. to the Harmon’s process- strategy matrix accounting services can be seen as being either of high or low 
complexity. But in both cases they are not core competences of ITS (UK) and therefore of only a low strategic 
importance. As such, they should be outsourced to a specialist service provider instead of tying up company in-
house resources (ACCA, 2015). 
 
Implications of target costing for the achievement of a target net margin 
 
ITS (UK) is engaged in IT outsourcing services. Its main cost drivers are not materials and product 
components, but labour and staff overhead costs. Under ITS (UK) target contract terms the margin is payable 
regardless of actual costs. But in reality the company struggles to control costs so that its margin per contract is 
misleading.  
This is even truer for its flexed contracts and reimbursable contracts. ITS (UK) groups the costs at 
departmental level and then charges these costs to the single contract. But due to the ever-changing customer 
requirements it hast to assign its IT staff to varying tasks. This makes it previous attempts to budget the costs 
largely useless.  
These problems would intensify if ITS (UK) was to apply TC more widely. TC calls for a stable 
environment and a manageable range of customer needs (Dyson, 2010; Terdpaopong & Visedsun, 2013).  
Atrill and McLaney (2010) show that service businesses should use activity based costing (ABC) instead. 
Using ABC, costs are assigned to products/services out of predetermined cost pools acc. to the activities 
consumed by the very product/service (Searcy & Roberts, 2007).  
ITS (UK) earns a gross margin of 20.99% on average. There are contracts that fail to earn a positive margin 
at all (Exoil Refinery E-Mail). They need a thorough review. The company’s policy to accept loss leading 
contracts for the sake of future business has not proved profitable yet – ITS (UK) is still losing on that contracts.  
The overhead costs account for 16.03% of sales, resulting in a net margin before tax of 20.99-16.03=4.96 
instead of the required 6%. If ITS (UK) fails to increase its gross margin, for example through a reduction of cost 
of sales, it should reduce overhead costs. 
 
Practical considerations on employee share schemes 
 
Despite of a rather negative view on share schemes in theory, they are widely used in practice to the benefit 
of corporate performance.  
Crush (2009) reports that a vast majority of share scheme participants under survey increased their working 
efforts and supported supervisor control of their colleagues. They also reduced their absence. Almost half of them 
followed the company’s financial performance on a weekly or a more often basis. Thomas (2012) shows that 
loyalty and commitment to the employer significantly increase among the participating employees, as does their 
attitude towards quality work.  
Given the different assessment of share schemes in theory and practice ITS (UK) should consider a reward 
scheme that would allow the employee to choose between shares and cash. Acc. to Hyman and Mason (1995) such 
schemes are highly valued by employees. Nevertheless, this should not replace training and promotional schemes to 
address personal attitudes of employees (Neckermann et al., 2009) and thus to motivate staff even more. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This work deals with the case study of ITS (UK) developed for the purposes of higher education by Colin 
Drury (2012). The paper analyses the Balanced Scorecard principles on the background of ITS (UK) and 
develops an innovative Balanced Scorecard in order to address the company strategy. Furthermore, the paper 
deals with decision making regarding recruiting and outsourcing accounting personnel at ITS (UK). Target 
Costing in use at ITS (UK) is evaluated against the company’s failure to achieve its net margin. Finally, the 
company’s share scheme is reviewed in connection with theories on employee motivation and reward. The work 
shows that diverse responses to the imposed research questions can be supported by academic literature and 
previous research, depending on company strategic goals and managerial assumptions. 
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